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CHICAGO-KENT
law, by what has been aptly termed judicial legislation, when they are defining
the limits of the protection to be given
an interest by a statute or by a rule of
the common law.
As to the problem whether proximate
cause is a question of fact for the jury,
or a question of law for the court, the
conclusion to be drawn from the cases is
that when the reviewing court determines that the hazard encountered is
within the range of the rule, then the
finding of the jury that there was proximate cause is final and conclusive, but
when the court determines that the hazard encountered is not within the range
of the rule, then the finding of the jury
that there was proximate cause is reversed as not supported by the evidence.
This is not rational, and can produce
nothing but confusion, because in one
case the finding of the jury is final and
conclusive, and in the next case it may
be reversed. All this confusion is the
natural and proximate result of the irrational orthodox method of determining
the answers to the many questions involved in a tort action by assuming them
to be questions of causal relation. And
until the trial court, in its judicial function, frankly meets and answers the questions: Has the plaintiff a legal right?
and, Is that right protected against the
particular hazard encountered? we shall
not have any clarification of the law as
regards the question of proximate cause.

A Farewell Message From
Class of February 1929
A new semester is well on its way at
good old Chicago-Kent and the members
of the Class of February 1929, for the
first time in three years no longer exchange friendly greetings in the halls at
10 North Franklin. Instead we are busily
engaged in brushing away mental cobwebs and refreshing our understanding
in the subject of legal jurisprudence
preparatory to the March Bar. We relax a moment however to extend to the
newcomers at School a most hearty welcome and wish them as pleasant and
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successful a period at Kent as has been
our pleasure to experience. To the members of the faculty, administration officers and many friends whom we leave
behind we say a fond farewell, hoping
to continue on into the future our many
For ourfriendships and associations.
selves it must be said that we intend to
carry on the progressive spirit of Chicago-Kent. We will have an opportunity
to evidence that by attending, every
man, at the Home Coming Luncheon to
be held on June the 6th. Our attendance
should be 100% as it is on the evening
of that day that we should formally receive our graduating credentials. Further announcements of these occasions
will be given later. Again let it be repeated to the members of the Class of
February, 1929, do not forget the annual
Home Coming.
ARTHUR C. JEPSON, Pres.

Round Table
The members of the Round Table held
their monthly meeting February 2nd at
the Electric Club with Mr. Eric Collins
presiding. The new members introduced
were as follows: Messrs. Lee L. Turoff,
'31, Frank A. Stromquist, '31, Allen M.
Klein, '31, John Rex Allen, Jr., '31, Morton B. Hochberg, '31, Walter H. Jentzsch,
'30, Edwin G. Gemrich, '30, Win. W.
Hamilton, '30, Robert J. Burdett, '30,
John M. Falasz, '30.
The speaker was Mr. Charles Francis
He gave us a
Baker of our faculty.
very profitable as well as enjoyable lecture on "Liability of Bailees for their
Principals' Goods." He first took up the
liability of a forwarder who waves the
common law liability, and laid down the
rule that the vendor has not implied authority to wave the common law liability
in Illinois without proof of an expressed
contract.
Mr. Baker also took up .the obligation
of the bailees to deliver the goods, holding that an express company must make
an actual delivery to the person to whom
the goods are consigned, and must deliver to that particular consignee, or it
is liable.

